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Executive summary 
Since the collapse of negotiations around a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, states parties have begun to discuss several novel 
issues linked to the broader implementation of the BWC as part of a series of 
intersessional meetings. While initially fruitful, this approach has generated diminishing 
returns in the last five years. Moreover, in addressing these broader issues of 
implementation, biological disarmament diplomacy has largely neglected the thorny 
issue of compliance.  
Compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment 
not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the 
obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and 
ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity 
surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited 
resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, 
without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become 
ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented.   
Although many states insist strengthening the convention can only be achieved through 
a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol, this is not politically 
feasible for the foreseeable future. Nor is this necessarily true; an incremental approach 
to strengthening the convention could be pursued, dealing with mutually reinforcing 
components of the regime in a balanced manner and laying the foundations for future 
work, if and when it becomes politically expedient to proceed.  
This Occasional Paper proposes a number of activities that could be pursued as part of 
an incremental approach to revisiting compliance with the BWC. These activities are 
summarized below.  
Revisit the 
relevant science 
and technology  
The science and technology of relevance to detecting, but also 
developing and disguising biological weaponeering has changed 
considerably since the work of verification experts in the early 
1990s. As such, there is a need to re-examine the science and 
technology of potential relevance to compliance under the BWC 
as part of a wider process of reviewing science and technology of 
relevance to the convention.  
Enhance the 
collection and 
analysis of 
compliance 
indicators 
Compliance begins at home, and one simple step toward 
monitoring compliance would be the submission of information on 
the activities undertaken by states parties to be compliant with the 
BWC. To some extent, this is already achieved with confidence-
building measures (CBMs), but there is a need for quantitative and 
qualitative improvements in the data collected. There is also a need 
to better use this information through assessments of national 
implementation using tools, such as peer review.  
Develop the 
consultative 
mechanism 
Article V of the BWC obliges states parties “to consult one another 
and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise.” This 
remains an important yet neglected tool for dealing with a 
potentially wide range of issues under the BWC, ranging from 
high-stakes accusations of non-compliance to comparatively 
minor disagreements and ambiguities. As such, states parties 
could usefully develop the BWC consultative mechanism through 
agreement around a flexible set of procedures and practices that 
could be applied in order to resolve any problems which may 
arise.  
Building the 
provision of 
assistance in the 
event of a 
violation of the 
BWC 
States parties have made some progress in developing 
understandings around the provision of assistance in the event of 
a violation of the Convention as required under Article VII. 
However a number of substantive and procedural questions 
remain which will be important to address in advance of any 
event in order to minimize the degree of “muddling through” in 
a time of acute crisis.  
Explore voluntary 
visits 
“Visits” are recognized as serving a number of functions, 
including a cooperative function, and would be an important part 
of any effort to strengthen the biological weapons regime. As 
such, another step could be to further explore voluntary visits with 
a view to building a greater appreciation of what can realistically 
be expected of them and to reach out to stakeholders with a view 
to exchanging ideas on better practices and drawing out lessons 
learned in biological disarmament.  
Enhance the 
United Nations 
Secretary-
General’s 
Mechanism 
(UNSGM) 
Allegations of association with biological weapons can be a 
powerful tool with which to “vilify enemies” and, in the event of 
any allegations of BW use, there is likely to be considerable 
misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda circulated 
through traditional and new media. This makes independent 
assessments of allegations by a neutral body, such as the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism (UNSGM), increasingly 
important. However, the biological component of UNSGM 
remains underdeveloped and, accordingly, there is a need 
enhance the UNSGM to ensure any biological investigation is 
able to withstand considerable international scrutiny.  
Remedy the 
institutional 
deficit 
The BWC’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) consists of three 
people (with some additional support through the European 
Union). Any initiatives intended to expand BWC-related 
compliance activities—or indeed of any other activities of the 
BWC— will require a commensurate expansion of the ISU.  
 
The paper argues that, while the norm against biological weapons embodied in the BWC 
continues to appear robust, norms as social constructs are neither permeant nor 
inviolable. Rather they remain subject to change, particularly in conditions where 
science and technology are evolving and the associated regimes are weak. As such, 
without revisiting compliance and tending the convention, there is a risk that the regime 
will be left to fester and fragment, in time potentially diminishing the norm against 
biological weapons. The 2017 Meeting of States Parties to the Convention held later this 
year presents an opportunity to revisit compliance with a view to bolstering the 
international prohibition on a category of weapons deemed “repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind” and states should seize this opportunity.   
  
Compliance Revisited:  
An Incremental Approach to Compliance in the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention 
James Revill 
In 2001, following the acrimonious collapse of nearly a decade of work toward a 
legally binding protocol to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BWC), states parties embarked upon a series of annual discussions 
between quinquennial review conferences. In part because expectations for these 
intersessional meetings were so low, the first two sets of annual meetings proved 
unexpectedly fruitful in terms of process and substance; however, over the course of 
the third intersessional process, they appear to have moved beyond their best-before-
date and turned stale.1  
 
For this reason, over the last few years, a number of states parties have sought 
alternative approaches to strengthen the convention, including a small number of 
proposals and initiatives linked to the thorny topic of compliance: the observation of 
the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by all BWC states parties. 
Although discussion on compliance within the BWC has been stymied by political 
sensitivities and is unlikely to manifest on the agenda soon, revisiting what is meant by 
compliance in the twenty-first century will be important if the BWC is to remain 
relevant in a rapidly changing world.  
 
It is against this background that this Occasional Paper seeks to revisit the concept of 
compliance in the BWC. It begins by outlining the convention’s recent history, and 
then proceeds to explore compliance, drawing on the broader work of legal scholars 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes to outline the complexity of compliance and the 
difficulties generated by ambiguity, capacity, and the temporal nature of disarmament 
agreements. It then examines verification as a means of evaluating compliance, 
building on the work of Douglas MacEachin, former Deputy Director for Intelligence, 
US Central Intelligence Agency, and Julian Perry Robinson, co-founder of the 
Harvard Sussex Program, to outline how the concept of a regime of declarations, 
visits, and inspections could potentially be applied in the future to detect 
noncompliance, but also dissuade cheaters and remove the camouflage provided by 
“dual-use” biotechnology.  
 
The article asserts that revisiting the protocol is not feasible in the foreseeable future. 
However, an incremental approach to strengthening the convention could be pursued, 
dealing with mutually reinforcing components of the regime in a balanced manner. 
Such a process could operationalize several components of a BWC compliance 
architecture and lay the foundations for future work, if and when it becomes politically 
expedient to proceed. The final section outlines several modest, practical steps that 
could be considered by states parties in this regard; either by working inside the 
																																																						
1 Richard Lennane, “Building on Success: The Future of the Intersessional Process,” in Piers Millet, ed., 
Improving Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (Geneva: United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research, 2011), pp. 259–66.  
convention where possible, or, in some cases working outside the convention to 
explore concepts before bringing them back in from the outside.  
The Evolution of the BWC 
Difficulties with the detection of noncompliance were recognized from the outset of 
discussions around biological disarmament in the mid-to-late 1960s; notwithstanding 
such difficulties, a proposal for a “quick and automatic” investigation of allegations of 
biological weapons (BW) use was put forward by the UK delegation during the 
negotiation of the BWC.2 At the time, however, neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union had sufficient appetite for such a proposal and it was omitted in the 
convention’s final text. Although provision for consultations (Article V) and complaints 
(Article VI) were included, the BWC entered into force in 1972 devoid of any means of 
evaluating the compliance of states parties with their obligations.  
 
Accordingly, there have been several efforts to develop “functional substitutes” for 
evaluating compliance, although not until the 1990s did states enter into serious 
discussion about remedying the “verification deficit.”3 Such discussion was achieved 
firstly through VEREX, an “ad hoc group of governmental experts” established in 1991 
to “identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical 
standpoint.” 4 In four sessions, twenty-one potential verification measures were 
identified and evaluated as “useful to varying degrees in enhancing confidence, 
through increased transparency, that States Parties were fulfilling their obligations 
under the BWC.”5  
 
The conclusions of VEREX were followed by a process of political negotiations in the 
form of the ad hoc group (AHG), which first met in early 1995. The AHG was 
mandated to “consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, 
and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a 
legally binding instrument.”6 Its work focused on a balanced package of activities in 
four areas: “definitions of terms and objective criteria,” “enhanced confidence building 
and transparency measures,” a “system of measures to promote compliance with the 
Convention,” and “specific measures designed to ensure effective and full 
implementation of Article X,” a reference to the convention’s provisions on scientific 
and technological exchanges for peaceful purposes.7  
 
Although this AHG process initially made progress, by the end of the 1990s it became 
stymied by political division, and it ultimately collapsed in 2001. Ostensibly, this was 
at the hands of the United States, which argued the treaty was not effectively verifiable: 
																																																						
2 Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, “Final verbatim record of the Conference of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [Meeting 418],” ENDC/P.418, p. 10; see also John R. 
Walker, Britain and Disarmament (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), p. 76.  
3 Nicholas Sims, The Evolution of Biological Disarmament, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies 
no.19 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 23. 
4 BWC, “Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference,” BWC/CONF.III/23, September 27, 1991, p. 
16. 
5 BWC, “Final Declaration of the Special Conference,” BWC/SPCONF/1 Part II, April 15, 1994, p. 10. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
“We will not be protected by a ‘Maginot treaty’ approach to the [biological weapon] 
threat.”8 However, the US position allowed several other states that had previously 
objected to aspects of the protocol to hide behind US policy.9  
 
This left a decade of work in stasis, or to quote Carleton University’s Jeremy Littlewood, 
either “like Sleeping Beauty awaiting the kiss that would bring it back to life” or, 
depending on one’s perspective, “a zombie rising from the grave” that “if unleashed … 
would inexorably drag States Parties back into a black hole of arguments.”10  
 
In an effort to salvage something from the collapse of the negotiations, AHG Chair 
Tibor Tóth offered states parties a “rescue package” of intersessional activities to 
“discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action” on a variety of 
issues, such as national legislation, biosecurity, and disease detection.11 This mandate 
represented a considerable shift away from the AHG’s pursuit of formal negotiations on 
a legal agreement and toward discussion on a number of new and novel issues linked 
to the broader implementation of the BWC.  
 
Although initially met with skepticism, the first intersessional process between 2003 and 
2005 proved an unexpected success, to the extent that, at the Sixth Review Conference 
in 2006, states parties agreed to undertake a similar exercise. By the time the Seventh 
Review Conference convened in 2011, a decade of discussion had demonstrated a 
number of procedural and substantive benefits from this mode of work. In terms of 
procedure, the intersessional processes served, inter alia: to improve relations between 
states following the acrimonious collapse of the protocol negotiations; to encourage 
open discussion devoid of the strictures of a negotiating climate; and to more closely 
integrate the scientific, academic, and nongovernmental communities in discussions 
around aspects of biological disarmament in Geneva. In terms of substance, the 
intersessional process enabled states parties to build a better understanding of new and 
novel areas, such as biosecurity, biorisk management, and codes of conduct for 
scientists. And it did so at a time of heightened concerns over bioterrorism, when such 
concepts were becoming increasingly important in contributing to the prevention of the 
use of biological weapons (BW) by non-state actors.12  
 
At the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, states parties agreed to continue 
intersessional meetings with only modest changes. Specifically, they agreed to focus 
their efforts on three standing agenda items (cooperation and assistance, science and 
technology, and national implementation) with two additional agenda items, 
																																																						
8 John R. Bolton, Statement to the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, 
Geneva, Switzerland, November 19, 2001, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/6231.htm>. 
9 Richard Lennane, “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention since 
2001,” Disarmament Forum, no. 3 (2006), p. 9.  
10 Jeremy Littlewood, “The Verification Debate in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 
2011,” Disarmament Forum, no. 3 (2011), p. 21. 
11 Nicholas Sims, “Biological Disarmament Diplomacy in the Doldrums; Reflections after the BWC Fifth 
Review Conference,” Disarmament Diplomacy 70 (2003), pp. 11–18. 
12 James Revill and Malcolm Dando, “The Rise of Biosecurity in International Arms Control,” in Brian 
Rappert and Chandré Gould, eds., Biosecurity: Origins, Transformations and Practices, New Security 
Challenges, (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 41–59.  
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and Article VII (providing assistance or support 
to states exposed to BW danger), scheduled for attention over the intersessional 
process. As such, this process perhaps satisfied the “prevailing needs and 
opportunities” upon which disarmament is contingent.13 However, such prevailing 
needs and opportunities are not fixed, but are rather context-dependent, and, after 
nearly a decade-and-a-half of intersessional meetings, several states have begun to 
question whether the intersessional process remains the most suitable vehicle for 
continuing progress in the BWC, or whether it has begun to go stale.  
 
Indeed, despite the third intersessional process between 2012 and 2015 allowing 
fruitful discussion in certain areas (particularly the provision of assistance in the event 
of a violation of the convention), the limited time for in-depth discussion and the 
continued lack of scope to make recommendations has yielded diminishing returns in 
terms of substantive agreements, yet alone effective action.14 Put bluntly by US 
Ambassador Robert Wood at the Preparatory Committee for the Eighth Review 
Conference, held in April 2016, “the last intersessional process simply did not work, 
and repeating it should not be considered a reasonable option by any delegation.”15  
 
To overcome the diminishing returns of the intersessional process, a number of states 
sought a more action-orientated program of work from the Eighth Review Conference 
in November 2016, with a number of proposals seeking to, inter alia, empower 
intersessional meetings to make more substantive decisions, improve the process of 
reviewing science and technology, enhance provision of assistance in the event of a 
violation of the convention, improve the consultative mechanism under Article V, and 
attend to the issue of compliance.  
 
However, some states—particularly Iran—viewed these ideas as a step in the wrong 
direction, and the Eighth Review Conference ended as “a great disappointment.”16 
With the exception of progress in the additional understanding linked to Article VII, the 
conference largely failed to update the additional understandings agreed upon at the 
Seventh Review Conference in 2011.17 Moreover, it failed to agree on a program of 
																																																						
13 Pál Dunay, “Arms Control in the Post-Cold War World,” in Pál Dunay, Márton Krasznai, Hartwig 
Spitzer, Rafael Wiemker, and William Wynne, eds., Open Skies—A Cooperative Approach to Military 
Transparency and Confidence Building (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2004), p. 6. 
14 Lennane, “Building on Success.” 
15 Statement by Robert Wood, US Ambassador, to the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the Eighth 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference Geneva, April 26, 2016, 
<https://geneva.usmission.gov/2016/04/27/ambassador-robert-woods-statement-at-the-bwc-preparatory-
committee-meeting/>. 
16 Jean-Pascal Zanders quoted in Jez Littlewood, “The Art of Looking for Trouble,” CBRNe World 54 
(December 2016), <https://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/Littlewood-2016-BWC-CBRNE-World-
The-art-of-looking-for-trouble.pdf>; see also Catherine Rhodes, “Make the Bioweapons Treaty Work,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2017 <http://thebulletin.org/make-bioweapons-treaty-work10755>. 
17 Review conferences seek to reach “additional understandings,” or “additional agreements,” to 
supplement the BWC. The BWC Implementation Support Unit defines additional agreement as one 
which “interprets, defines or elaborates the meaning or scope of a provision of the convention; or (b) 
provides instructions, guidelines or recommendations on how a provision should be implemented.” See 
“Additional agreements reached by previous Review Conferences relating to each article of the 
Convention,” BWC/CONF.VII/INF.5, September 28, 2011, <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/638/47/PDF/G1163847.pdf?OpenElement>. 
substantive work between the Eighth and Ninth Review Conferences, and instead 
“decided that States Parties will hold annual meetings” mandated to “make progress on 
issues of substance and process for the period before the next Review Conference, with 
a view to reaching consensus on an intersessional process.”18 
 
The outcome is that the last fifteen years have been marked by a conspicuous absence 
of any serious discussion around the thorny issue of compliance, tension around which 
continues to simmer beneath the surface. Despite some states’ efforts to broach the 
topic—either by proposing a conceptual discussion or exploring innovative approaches 
that could contribute to building confidence in compliance, such as voluntary peer-
review-type activities —the topic remains sensitive to many states.19 Yet sensitive or 
not, without episodically revisiting the concept of compliance (with all the 
convention’s provisions), there remains the risk that BWC compliance will become 
ever more fragmented and outmoded as the scientific and security context continues to 
evolve. This has wider implications for the norm against biological warfare that is 
embodied in the BWC. Although it has been correctly argued that the norm is currently 
“widely recognized and seldom contested,” norms as social constructs are not 
sacrosanct and remain vulnerable to change, particularly in conditions of changing 
science and weakened regimes. 20  
 
The BWC is an “artefact of political choice” and its formulation and conclusion have 
been “designed to ensure that the final result will represent, to some degree, an 
accommodation of the interests of the negotiating states.”21 Making the decision to join 
the convention is therefore not something taken lightly; it entails a commitment to 
“limit the absolute sovereignty of a state party to defend itself.”22 Moreover, it requires 
considerable time and political will to secure the interagency commitments necessary 
to sign and ratify an international agreement.23  
 
Complying with the convention is therefore more than a binary choice to sign a 
commitment not to develop or produce BW.24 As critically important as this Article I 
undertaking is, compliance can be understood more broadly as the observation of all 
																																																						
18 BWC, “Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference,” BWC/CONF.VIII/4, January 11,  2017. 
19 On the conceptual discussion of compliance, see, inter alia, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
and Switzerland, “We Need to Talk about Compliance,” BWC/MSP/2012/WP.11, December 12, 2012, 
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/639/38/PDF/G1263938.pdf?OpenElement>. 
20 Lennane, Richard. “Divide and Delegate: The Future of the BWC, 2016,”  
International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) BWC Briefing paper number 1 <http://nwp.ilpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/01-Divide-and-delegate-gold.pdf>.  
21 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47 (1993), 
pp. 175–205.  
22 Jean Pascal Zanders, “Challenges to Disarmament Regimes: The Case of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention,” Global Society 15 (2001), p. 364.  
23 Treasa Dunworth, Robert J. Mathews, and Timothy Mc Cormack, “National Implementation of the 
Biological Weapons Convention,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 11 (Spring 2006), pp. 93–118.  
24 Antonia Handler Chayes, and Abram Chayes, “From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A New 
Approach to Arms Control Verification and Compliance,” International Security 14 (April 1990), pp. 
147–64. 
the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties.25 
Beyond the Article I obligations not “to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise 
acquire or retain” BW, additional negative obligations include the Article III 
commitment not to “transfer to any recipient whatsoever … agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery,” as well as the Article X undertaking to implement the 
convention in a manner that “avoid[s] hampering the economic or technological 
development of States … or international cooperation in the field of peaceful 
bacteriological (biological) activities.”26  
 
In contrast, the term positive obligations refer to actions that states parties have agreed 
to take. Under Article IV, for example, states are required to undertake “any necessary 
measures to prohibit and prevent” the development of BW within their territory. Article 
VII requires states parties to assist others that have “been exposed to a danger as a 
result of a violation” of the BWC and, based on widely accepted interpretations of 
Article X, to do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of 
biological science and technology.  
Clarity of obligations 
As with other international agreements (indeed, perhaps more so because of the succinct 
nature of the BWC text and its somewhat hasty negotiation) many obligations under the 
BWC are ambiguous.27 The additional understandings reached at successive review 
conferences, along with more than fifteen years of intersessional discussions, have 
helped flesh out some treaty obligations. Moreover, there likely remains much 
underexploited “substance hidden under [the] mountain of paper” produced in and for 
these discussions since 2002.28 Nevertheless, elaborate, concrete, common 
understandings have been few and far between over the course of the intersessional 
processes, with some aspects of the biological disarmament discourse suggesting 
divergence, rather than convergence, in the shared expectations of BWC states parties.29 
 
Article I prohibits any use of biological agents or toxins that are not intended for 
“prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”30 This focus on intent—rather 
than a list-based approach—instills the BWC (as well as the 1997 Chemical Weapons 
Convention or CWC) with a timeless quality, as new developments in biology that 
could otherwise be excluded from any agreed-upon list would be covered. 
Nevertheless, it serves as a source of ambiguity, and abstract concepts such as 
“prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” remain open to different 
interpretations.  
 
																																																						
25 Richard Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: If Not the Protocol, Then What?” Disarmament Forum, 
no. 1 (2011), pp. 39-50. 
26 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC), March 26, 1975, Articles I, III, and X.  
27 Sims, The Evolution of Biological Disarmament, p. 4. 
28 Jeremy Littlewood, “Substance Hidden under a Mountain of Paper: The BWC Experts’ Meeting in 
2003,” Disarmament Diplomacy no. 73 (2003), pp. 63–66. 
29 James Revill, “Deconstructing the BWC Seventh Review Conference, Workshop Summary,” University 
of Sussex, March 8, 2012,  
30 BWC, Article I(1). 
For example, does Article I cover the infestation of “munching insects” such as Thrips 
palmi;31 are anti-material biological agents—genetically engineered microbes that can 
degrade a variety of substances—prohibited under the convention;32 is it acceptable to 
conduct H5N1 influenza gain-of-function research?33 These are questions around 
which there has been fundamental disagreement; certainly in relation to the latter, Iran 
has suggested that such research falls within a “gray zone,” an argument supported by 
some civil-society actors, and which, given past additional understandings under 
Article I concerning the open-air release of pathogens, is not entirely unreasonable.34 
Yet there are also strong public-health grounds for undertaking such research, 
something recognized by several states, including the Netherlands, as important in 
order to help “understand the potential transmissibility of influenza strains, which can 
significantly benefit public health.”35 
With the growing salience of bioterrorism, Article IV, which deals with national 
implementation, has become increasingly important. Although Article IV’s obligation 
to “prohibit” is fairly clear-cut, the simplicity of the article lends itself to some degree 
of ambiguity. Unlike the CWC, there are no matrices of key areas of national 
legislation, nor an unequivocal obligation to undertake penal legislation concerning 
such activity.36 More ambiguous is the obligation that states parties take necessary 
measures to “prevent” BW domestically. Topics, such as codes of conduct and 
education and outreach, have received much attention at the intersessional meetings. 
Does this mean one can now assume these constitute necessary measures for 
“preventing” BW as required under Article IV? Certainly, some nongovernmental 
organizations have made a case for precisely that; yet the record of effective action 
undertaken would suggest they are not obligations, but supplementary “commitments” 
under Article IV.  
 
																																																						
31 See for example, Nicholas Sims, The Evolution of Biological Disarmament, SIPRI Chemical & 
Biological Warfare Studies no.19 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 45.  
32 See “Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, n.d., 
<https://fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/nonlethal.html>; see also United States of America, “Article 
I: Reinforcing the core prohibition of the Biological Weapons Convention,” BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.14, 
October 25, 2016. 
33 Gain-of-function research aims to add capabilities to an existing virus in order to “enable the 
assessment of the pandemic potential of emerging infectious agents, and inform public health and 
preparedness efforts.” See Francis S. Collins, “Statement on Funding Pause on Certain Types of Gain-of-
Function Research,” National Institutes of Health, October 17, 2014, <www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-
are/nih-director/statements/statement-funding-pause-certain-types-gain-function-research>.  
34 Simon Wain-Hobson, “H5N1 Viral-Engineering Dangers Will Not Go Away,” Nature 495 (March 
2013), <www.nature.com/news/h5n1-viral-engineering-dangers-will-not-go-away-1.12677>. On past 
Additional Understandings, see BWC, “Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference,” 
BWC/CONF. IV/9 Part II, December, 6, 1996, p. 16.  
35 The Netherlands, as cited in BWC, “Report the Meeting of Experts, Annex: Considerations, lessons, 
perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, 
working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting,” BWC/MSP/2012/MX/3, 
August 3, 2012, p. 22.  
36 Nicholas A. Sims, “The status of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in relation to the 
prevention of bioterrorism,” in Ian Bellany, ed., Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Responding to the Challenge (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 158–79. 
Article X can also be seen as ambiguous, with disparate interpretations of both its focus 
and function. In terms of the focus, Article X encourages cooperation in the “prevention 
of disease,” but also “other peaceful purposes,” with the latter in particular open to 
broad interpretations.37 Similarly, the function is ambiguously constructed and 
encourages both “regulatory and promotional” activities.38 Several states, particularly 
from the Non-Aligned Movement, have vociferously emphasized the promotional aspect 
of Article X, not unreasonably so for states that face a significant disease burden but 
remain relatively untroubled by biological-weapons threats. In contrast, Western states 
are perhaps more focused on the obligation to avoid hindering international cooperation 
or technology transfers; and at least one Western state explicitly argued that Article X 
“does not impose any obligation mandating transfers between States Parties.”39 
The temporal dimension 
The BWC does not operate in a vacuum, and the expectations of states parties are 
influenced by, inter alia, changes in the capacity and geography of the life sciences, 
evolving perceptions of security threats, and a shifting understanding of the relationship 
between disarmament and development.40 In this regard, compliance is not an end-
point where efforts can be considered completed, biological disarmament ticked off 
the to-do list, and attention moved elsewhere. Rather, “being compliant” is a state that 
requires episodic re-evaluation in order to be sustained.  
 
This notion of temporality is not unique to the BWC; Chayes and Chayes have 
suggested disarmament agreements generally have a “temporal dimension.”41 
However, it is particularly problematic in the BWC context, wherein the broader 
environment has changed considerably since 1972. Certainly, the relevant science and 
technology, while perhaps not quite as “revolutionary” as some commentators have 
suggested, continues to make incremental steps around the globe and in a number of 
interlinked areas, cumulatively enabling a greater understanding of the fundamental 
life processes and empowering scientists with an increasing capacity to manipulate 
biology.42 Moreover, such capabilities are no longer restricted to a small number of 
laboratories in the Western world—if indeed they ever were—but are becoming 
increasingly distributed around an interconnected globe. These changes in the human 
geography of life-science research are coupled with growth in the range of 
disciplines—from engineering to computer science—that feed into advances in the life 
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sciences, and the emergence of activities that operate outside of the traditional 
laboratory settings, such as “DIY Bio.” 43 
 
Concerns over changes in the capacity and (human) geography of the life sciences 
have shaped—and been shaped by—perceptions of the security challenge posed by 
BW. The confluence of events in 2001—specifically September 11, 2001, and the 
subsequent anthrax attacks—fueled the salience of bioterrorism in the international-
security discourse.44 It is perhaps for these reasons that the emphasis of the BWC 
regime has, for some states at least, expanded from a narrow focus on preventing the 
emergence and proliferation of major offensive state BW programs to the broader and 
more complex challenge of managing dual-use research across the globe.45  
 
Finally, the agenda items for past intersessional meetings suggest that “increasing attention 
has been devoted to issues related to the international cooperation and development 
norm” embodied in Article X, where states pledge to “participate in the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information” for 
“peaceful purposes” of biological agents.46 There is little to suggest Article X was divisive 
during the negotiation of the BWC. However, broader influences, such as, inter alia, the 
creation in 1980 of the Australia Group—an informal forum of states agreeing to 
harmonize export controls to minimize chemical and BW proliferation—have fed into the 
growing salience of Article X in BW disarmament diplomacy.47  
Capacity 
The capacity of states to comply with the BWC remains an issue. Transposing the 
positive and negative obligations of the convention onto the national level is a 
significant task, particularly for states with limited resources and/or with rapidly 
expanding biotechnology sectors. Article IV, for example, can be seen as imposing a 
“heavy burden” upon some states, and one that they may not be able or willing to 
fulfill because of the resources required to do so.48 Indeed, if CBMs are proving difficult 
for some states to complete due to a lack of resources to monitor life-science research 
and development, it raises serious questions about those states’ capacities to adopt, 
promulgate, and enforce legislation across the often diverse and fluid national 
community of life scientists.49 
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Moreover, the temporal nature of the BWC, specifically the growing salience of 
bioterrorism, will potentially generate new issues related to capacity, with an 
expanding array of measures that several states have identified as requisite for 
preventing the development of biological weapons domestically. As Littlewood has 
noted, “the convention is the foundation of much activity at the frontline of biosafety 
and biosecurity.”50 However, despite various opportunities for assistance available to 
states parties, an implementation gap is likely to remain in part because of the limited 
capacity of many states.  
… and Verification 
The complexity of compliance has repercussions for efforts to build greater confidence 
in verification—the process of evaluating and determining compliance. Verification has 
been defined by Richard Lennane, former Head of the BWC Implementation Support 
Unit, as  
a structured and systematic means of: 
 
a. providing an increased level of assurance that States Parties are complying 
with the prohibitions and obligations of the Convention; and  
b. promptly, effectively and impartially investigating cases of alleged or apparent 
noncompliance with the prohibitions of the Convention.51  
 
The primary function of a verification regime would be to detect noncompliance; 
however, as noted during the work of the Ad Hoc Group, “a verification regime aimed 
at detecting evasion that even performs only moderately well, is likely to have a 
significant deterrent effect on potential evaders.”52  
 
In this regard, it is worth revisiting at least one approach to verification that has been 
developed by Douglas MacEachin. Writing in 1998, MacEachin stated, “[a]bsent a 
regime for subjecting legitimate activities to a high degree of transparency, the best 
way for a violator to carry out a covert programme would be to bury it — piggy-back 
it—inside a legitimate programme.”53 In contrast, with “a regime for subjecting 
legitimate activities to a high degree of transparency,” those seeking to violate the 
convention would be forced into the black, secret world where they are required to 
operate “under the strictest secrecy and vulnerable to leaks.”54 The dual-use 
characteristics of biotechnology therefore provides aspiring bioweaponeers with a 
potential civilian cover that, in the absence of a verification regime, can be used to 
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mask prohibited activities. The would-be weaponeers need only to hide the purpose of 
any program, not the facilities, equipment, personnel, and materials.  
 
As such, a secondary function of any BWC verification regime would therefore be to 
deter by weakening dual-use cover, forcing bioweaponeers to hide the purpose and 
the program. Hiding a substantial biological-weapons program is not likely to be easy. 
Even with considerable advances in the life sciences, any program seeking to develop 
reliable and predictable (as opposed to crude or “scruffy”) BW with significant effect 
would likely require social commitments to function; specifically, it would need 
contracts, funders, brokers, and backers.55 By removing the camouflage of peaceful 
purpose, cheaters would be forced to cease work, withdraw from the regime, or shift 
activities to conditions that are more anomalous, thereby potentially making things 
more visible.56 
 
Accordingly, regardless of whatever semantic gymnastics or rebranding exercises are 
conjured up by the diplomatic community, BWC verification essentially entails the 
“collection, collation and analysis of information in order to make a judgment as to 
whether a party is complying with its obligations.”57 Although the specific means and 
methods employed would likely be very different to the model envisaged in the 
protocol discussions, it would nonetheless be based around three complementary 
processes: monitoring, assessment, and evaluation.58  
 
Monitoring 
First, verification requires the monitoring and collecting of relevant data pertaining to 
measures and activities that appear to either reinforce or undermine the BWC. In both 
the CWC verification system and the IAEA safeguards system, this is achieved through 
declarations, which form a “‘baseline’ of international monitoring” and, in the CWC 
context, theoretically form an “integral part of the regime of international monitoring, 
allowing the Secretariat to monitor the global movement of scheduled chemicals and to 
identify suspicious transfers or trends.”59 Moreover, declarations were a key component 
of the work of VEREX and the AHG and widely accepted in principle as a key part of any 
BWC verification architecture.60 However, there was considerable disagreement on the 
scope of declarations, particularly in relation to topics such as biodefense.  
 
In the case of the BWC, there are several indicators of national activities that reinforce 
the convention, including, inter alia, domestic legislation, oversight mechanisms, 
transparency in biodefense, or biosecurity measures. Examples of national activities 
that could undermine the prohibition include, inter alia, “suspicious transactions”; 
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doctrine and training for BW; or the emergence of “secret, special and military 
facilities.”61 Notably, caution is needed in using indicators based exclusively on 
knowledge of past programs, if adequate available information on such programs 
exists. Future state BW programs may follow pathways to development similar to those 
of the past, but are more likely to have different footprints and exploit different 
technologies or facilities to different ends. The overt, state-level development of BW 
intended for massive casualties will generate particular footprints potentially 
identifiable by certain indicators. However, the same set of indicators may be less 
useful in detecting covert, small-scale BW development intended for sabotage or 
localized acts of terrorization. This is significant as the utility of BW cannot be 
decoupled from their intended purpose, which suggests consideration must be given as 
to which indicators are used to what end.   
 
Given the broad definition of compliance outlined above, evaluation also requires 
gathering data on activities that reinforce or undermine other obligations of the BWC, 
such as those under Article X. Indicators of activities reinforcing international 
cooperation could include international exchanges of scientists, bilateral research 
programs, the twinning of facilities across borders, and examples of technology 
transfer. In contrast, indicators of activities that undermine international cooperation 
could include denials of export-control licenses or rejected visa applications.  
 
Assessment 
Suspicious transfers, controversial biodefense research, or export-license denials, on 
their own, are not necessarily indicative of noncompliance. Yet the collection and 
collation of such indicators allows states parties to develop a picture of another state’s 
compliance. Piecing together this picture constitutes the second phase of a verification 
process and is achieved through technical assessment of the data collected in the 
monitoring process,62 with a view to providing a “technical basis for answering a 
fundamentally political question.”63  
 
This process is augmented by two other key tools. The first is a mechanism for 
consultation and cooperation in “solving any problems which may arise in relation to 
the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention,” as laid out 
under Article V of the BWC. Mistaken or misplaced information does not necessarily 
correspond with a deliberate effort to cheat, and there may be reasonable explanations 
that account for a series of indicators that hint at noncompliance. Indeed, compliance 
issues are not necessarily “questions of good and evil,” and accordingly, a flexible 
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“safe space” is required to consult and clarify information submitted by – or pertaining 
to the compliance of – states.64  
 
The second is some combination of visits and investigations. Both are required for an 
effective verification mechanism. Routine-type visits to facilities serve, among other 
things, to corroborate data submitted pertaining to a particular facility and incentivize 
states to make sure the information they submitted is accurate. Investigations would 
serve to determine “facts relating to a specific concern about possible noncompliance 
with the Convention.”65 Moreover, the threat of inspections could encourage states to 
declare all facilities and further discourage any efforts to stray from the stipulated 
activities taking place in any given location.66 
 
Evaluation 
The third step is an evaluation, based on the available data, of whether a country is in 
compliance.67 Absent irrefutable evidence, the process of evaluation is subjective and 
political.68 The nature of the evidence and how much of it is needed for states to reach, 
either collectively or individually, a political judgment of noncompliance is unlikely to 
be quantifiable; nor is the process of reaching a judgment something which can be 
achieved objectively and impartially.69 It requires a system that generates enough 
relevant and reliable information to tip the balance between the costs and benefits of 
participation in the regime in its favor. In short, the threshold of required information is 
whatever is necessary to assure states parties that they remain better off inside—not 
outside—the regime.70   
Strengthening the convention  
Since there have been no withdrawals from the BWC and an increasing number of 
states joining it, it can be inferred that the benefits of being in the BWC regime, even 
without a verification mechanism, continue to outweigh the costs of being outside it. 
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Despite a small number of allegations of BW development,71 the convention embodies 
a normative opprobrium on BW, with such weapons overwhelmingly eschewed by 
state (and non-state) actors, and the practice of biological warfare likely to be damned 
as the act of a pariah.72 Paradoxically, the success of this norm has perhaps led to a 
drift in high-level policy attention to the convention as BW has declined as a priority 
national-security issue for many states parties, if indeed it ever was one. Nevertheless, 
as long as there is a need to both reaffirm the norms embodied in the BWC and to 
suppress activities that could potentially undermine them, a process of what US 
Ambassador Charles Flowerree described as “tending” the convention remains 
necessary, all the more so given the changes in science and security and the limited 
progress achieved at (and since) the Eighth Review Conference.73  
 
There are several possible pathways to “tending” the convention. Many states have 
long insisted that the only sustainable method of strengthening the BWC is through a 
multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol.74 Such a principled 
approach is perhaps understandable, and many individuals invested considerable 
personal and professional energy in the protocol negotiations. However, while a 
decade of work drawing on the collective wisdom of delegates in Geneva has 
produced a wealth of materials (some of which have continued utility), politically, the 
route of revisiting the protocol as a whole is effectively closed for the time being. 
Moreover, considerable effort would be required to reopen negotiations and update 
discussions for the twenty-first rather than the twentieth century.  
 
Another alternative, proposed by the Russian Federation during the third intersessional 
process, was to strengthen the convention by returning to the 1994 mandate, but 
omitting work on verification and instead focusing on developing a legally binding 
instrument to address, inter alia, national implementation, cooperation, and a 
“mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological weapons.”75 They argued that 
such an approach could strengthen the BWC and improve implementation in many 
areas, as well as building institutional capacity. However, the proposal appears to have 
gained only limited traction thus far, with some states unenthused by the prospect of 
returning to negotiations and others reluctant to depart from the principled position of 
support for a verification protocol.  
 
Furthermore, history would suggest that, rather than investing more time and energy to 
engineer a “paradigm shift” of returning to negotiations on a protocol, an incremental 
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approach may be a more practicable and fruitful course of action, particularly if such 
an approach is “balanced” in how it serves the diverse interests of states parties.76 Such 
a balanced, incremental approach could incorporate a series of modest, practical steps 
that generates benefits to all states parties.  
 
Undertaking such steps is not a panacea for dealing with the challenges of BW, nor 
should states parties expect them to lead directly to a verification mechanism (or even 
resolve the Article X debate). However, small steps taken over time could lay the 
foundations for more informed concrete actions in the future and represent a preferable 
approach to leaving compliance to fragment and fester “until the emergence of an 
actual problem, a time that is not conducive to constructive dialogue on what 
compliance behavior may or may not be.”77 
Revisit the science and technology of compliance  
More than a quarter of a century has passed since the initiation of VEREX. While the 
general conclusion—that certain combinations of measures could support the 
verification process—may still hold true, it would be remarkable if advances in science 
and technology had not affected the evaluation of the twenty-one potential verification 
measures identified (particularly those in the areas of “Information Monitoring” and 
“Remote Sensing”) or created new opportunities for verification. Indeed, the VEREX 
group explicitly acknowledged the technological limitations of the time: “certain 
current scientific and technical shortcomings of some measures were appreciated,” 
adding that “some technologies associated with particular measures are limited by the 
commercial availability of equipment, materials and stages of development.”78  
 
There have certainly been a number of technological developments in recent years, such 
as biosensors, satellite surveillance, and the embryonic field of bio-forensics which 
could considerably enhance measures falling under “Remote Sensing.”79 In addition, 
there are new sources of electronic information, such as the UN Comtrade Database—“a 
repository of official international trade statistics”—Google, Twitter, and YouTube, none 
of which were available in the 1990s, and which could supplement traditional 
approaches to data collection and technical assessment and enhance measures under 
the AHG category of “Information Monitoring.”80 There are also new practices and 
trends in the life sciences that have changed since VEREX, along with new methods of 
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biological production, all of which are likely to have significant implications for efforts to 
evaluate BWC compliance. Finally, the historical record may also provide new 
knowledge derived from experiences with investigations in Iraq, and perhaps even Syria, 
that could provide “potential proliferation pointers from the past.”81 
 
The notion of a “VEREX 2.0” is likely to generate a number of political sensitivities—
just as VEREX did two decades ago—and is not presently feasible.82 However, a body 
mandated to examine and assess possibilities for developing and detecting BW as part 
of a wider process of reviewing science and technology of relevance to the convention 
is possible. Successive intersessional processes have touched upon topics of relevance 
to compliance, and at the Eighth Review Conference, the vast majority of states 
supported further work on science and technology (S&T) in principle, even if there was 
disagreement on, inter alia, the purpose, breadth of participation, and modalities of 
such a review process.    
 
Agreement not just on the principles, but also the practicalities of an S&T review 
process would be a major achievement at the annual meeting scheduled for December 
2017, regardless of whether this is achieved through a Science Advisory Committee as 
proposed by Russia or the more open and flexible working group proposed by others. 
S&T underpins many aspects of the convention, including compliance, but also 
cooperation and assistance,83 with scientific and technological meetings providing one 
of the most important practical methods of exchanging information on technology for 
peaceful purposes. As such, the BWC requires “more frequent and focused” review of 
S&T developments, including identifying developments relevant to compliance.84 
Collection and analysis of compliance indicators 
Compliance begins at home. One simple step toward monitoring compliance would be 
the submission of information on the activities undertaken by states parties to be 
compliant with the BWC. To achieve this in the absence of declarations, some—
regrettably not all—states parties have been submitting BWC CBMs since 1987, with 
submissions peaking in 2016 with a record eighty-two state submissions.85 In their 
current form, the CBM forms cover a number of issues, including: information on 
national biodefense research, outbreaks of infectious disease, and national legislation, 
regulations, and other measures undertaken. More recently, information provided in 
these CBMs has been augmented by other BWC-specific materials, such as national 
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reports on domestic implementation and Article X-related activities; and documents 
developed for other bodies, such as the national reports submitted pursuant to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and its follow-up resolutions.  
 
CBMs and national reports are clearly not a substitute for verification, but such data 
nonetheless can partially fulfill a monitoring function. Indeed, as Lennane has 
indicated, “CBMs are in some sense already a kind of declaration regime.”86 However, 
there are problems both in terms of the quality and quantity of CBM submissions, and 
it remains unclear the extent to which CBMs are actually used by states parties for any 
form of assessment process.87 As such, there is a need to improve the quantity and 
quality of CBMs, but also to make better use of such information, potentially through 
the “development of mechanisms that permit an assessment of implementation at the 
national level.”88  
 
Already some states have begun the process of inviting scrutiny of their domestic BWC 
implementation through peer-review exercises: “systematic examination[s] and 
assessment[s] of the performance of a State by other States, with the ultimate goal of 
helping the reviewed State improve its policy making, adopt best practices, and 
comply with established standards and principles.”89 Several states have undertaken 
such peer-review-type exercises, the German Peer Review process, for example, “was 
an assessment of all aspects of the [Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology] facility that 
are relevant to provisions of the BTWC and provided on the CBM Form”;90 whereas the 
US “Implementation Review Initiative” sought, to inter alia, “… closely examine and 
document its implementation of the BWC … [and]…  reassure other BWC States 
Parties of U.S. compliance with the BWC’s implementation obligations.”91 
 
The wider use of such peer-review-type exercises could prove useful in assessing 
national implementation around the world, and, in the longer term, feed into 
an iterative process of determining reasonable expectations for what constitutes 
compliance under the convention and how this can be most effectively achieved. For 
example, through a combination of materials submitted under Resolution 1540, 
																																																						
86 Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC.” 
87 See Norway, Switzerland, and New Zealand, “Confidence-Building Measures,” 
BWC/CONF.VII/WP.21 <www.filippalentzos.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/BWC.CONF_.VII_.WP.21-copy.pdf>.  
88 Jez Littlewood, “The Verification Debate in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 2011,” 
Disarmament Forum, Issue 3 (October, 2010), <www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/arms-control-
verification-en-320.pdf> pp. 15–27. 
89 Pagani, Fabricio. “Peer Review as a Tool for Co-Operation and Change: An Analysis of an OECD 
Working Method.” African Security Review 11, No. 4 (2002). 
90 Germany Switzerland and the United Kingdom. “Confidence in Compliance - Peer Review Visit 
Exercise at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich, Germany, 2016. 
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11, 21 October 2016, 
<www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1F158C667ABAAEBDC1258057004E5D1A/$file/BW
CCONF.VIIIWP.11.pdf>. 
91 United States. BWC Implementation Review Initiative: Report by the United States of America on the 
Visit to Washington, DC, 2016. BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.18, 9 November 
2016,<www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/93BA88CE8BEF9C31C125806800368E8F/$file/
BWCCONF.VIIIWP.18.pdf>.  
intersessional discussions, national reports, and CBMs, there exists a body of data from 
which states parties could begin to identify expected “elements of legislative and 
administrative implementation” and build a matrix of key areas of national 
implementation, thereby removing some of the ambiguity of obligations under Article 
IV and potentially other aspects of the convention.  
Develop the consultative mechanism 
Article V of the BWC obliges states parties “to consult one another and to cooperate in 
solving any problems which may arise.” Despite efforts during the First, Second, and 
Third Review Conferences to develop consultative procedures and processes, they 
remain underdeveloped and underutilized. Yet such a tool remains important, offering 
a potential means to clarify ambiguities, structure a process of consultation, and 
manage “the inevitable stream of disputes about interpretation and application” of the 
BWC.92 Although formal, high-stakes accusations of BWC violations in the form of BW 
development remain unlikely (however possible), the complexity of compliance—its 
ambiguity and vulnerability to changing contexts and capacities—suggests such a 
consultative mechanism would more likely be applied to a trickle of comparatively 
minor disagreements over interpretations. With the protocol approach closed off, 
Article V provides one “useful avenue for enhancing compliance with the BWC.”93  
 
Accordingly, an important component of revisiting compliance is re-exploring the 
consultation and clarification provisions of the convention to draw out the “latent 
potential” of Article V and establish a flexible set of consultative measures, that allow 
“States Parties to select a method of consultation commensurate to the gravity of the 
problem identified.”94 This is an area with some support. Both the United States and 
the European Union have proposed further exploration of the consultative provisions, 
and a number of possible bilateral and multilateral options were identified over the 
course of the Eighth Review Conference.95 These ranged from developing “procedures 
for private bilateral consultations,” to “facilitated bilateral consultations,” to 
multilateral peer-review exercises, to establishing a multilateral “Consultative 
Committee of Experts.”96  
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Further exploration of such options—potentially including trial consultation or 
clarification exercises in which, for example, CBM ambiguities were publicly 
discussed—would be a useful step. Article V consultations can be applied to a range of 
issues under the BWC,97 and in addition to generating greater confidence in 
compliance with the convention, the process might usefully serve to re-invigorate the 
BWC and desensitize discussions on compliance.  
Building the provision of assistance in the event of a violation of the BWC 
Under BWC Article VII, states parties undertake “to provide or support assistance… in 
the event of a violation of the Convention.” The assistance provision has never been 
invoked and, in the absence of agreement around specific procedures (such as those 
devised during the AHG), there is likely to be a degree of uncertainty about the 
provision of support in the event of a violation. To overcome this uncertainty, the 2014 
and 2015 BWC meetings generated useful discussions around Article VII, including the 
possibility of holding table-top exercises on the implementation of Article VII.98 
 
Article VII was one of the few topics at the 2016 Review Conference where states 
advanced additional understandings, including the consensus agreement to establish a 
database to facilitate assistance under Article VII, a proposal put forth by France and 
India.99 Populating this database will be an important task, as will be determining what 
BWC states parties could realistically offer in the event of an attack, beyond providing 
assistance through established public-health channels. It is equally important to 
develop procedures for invoking Article VII to avoid a situation of states “muddling 
through” at a time of acute crisis. This requires clarification on several issues, ranging 
from how assistance will be delivered and coordinated to the evidentiary requirements 
for the invocation of this article, to the direction of requests for assistance, to the 
harmonization of interaction with other communities of practice, to the format and 
content of requests for assistance.100  
 
Dealing with the substantive and procedural issues pertaining to Article VII will require 
a significant and sustained effort that goes beyond the eighteen or so hours that were 
allotted during the last two years of the third intersessional process. Indeed, given the 
need for greater clarity—and the fact that Article VII was one of the few areas of 
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convergence at the review conference—enhancing the provision of assistance under 
Article VII could be the basis of a working group, an idea proposed by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in 2016.101 
Explore Voluntary Visits 
The various concepts identified under the rubric of “visits” (as opposed to 
investigations) in the AHG negotiations were recognized as serving a number of 
functions, including validating material submitted by states parties, encouraging 
transparency and accuracy of submissions, clarifying issues, providing an 
understanding of how biosecurity and biosafety operate in practice, building relations 
between institutions and international and local actors, and deterring 
noncompliance.102 In addition, several states identified a cooperative function for visits. 
As a 1999 working paper by Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, and Norway stated:  
In addition to strengthening the compliance regime, the improvement of States 
Parties’ capabilities through technical cooperation and assistance activities or 
programmes in the context of visits would be a cost-effective means for the 
Organization to simultaneously discharge some of its tasks under the various 
provisions of the Protocol.103 
Visits can be considered an important part of any effort to strengthen the regime. Yet 
they are also potentially divisive and difficult: as the United Kingdom noted, there are 
“likely to be considerable problems over agreeing the parameters of such visits.”104 
However, such problems are likely to be considerably more acute in the absence of 
any significant practical experience among BWC states parties with how visits would 
work, what can realistically be achieved in a visit, and what logistical challenges a 
visiting team may face.  
 
As such, another step could be to further explore voluntary visits with a view to 
building a greater appreciation of what can realistically be expected of them, or to 
reach out to stakeholders for exchanging ideas on better practices. Several states have 
expressed support for exploring visits;105 some have even undertaken visits as part of 
various BWC-related peer-review-type exercises. For example, Chile has employed 
visits in its BWC implementation review exercise, the Benelux peer-review process 
included two onsite visits, and Germany invited states parties to a “compliance visit in 
August 2016,” adding that, while not a substitute for verification, visits and peer review 
“can serve as a useful tool until such verification may be achieved.”106 This practice is 
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likely to familiarize states with being scrutinized and can potentially provide a better 
understanding of the challenges and benefits of visits. 
Enhancing the UN Secretary-General’s Investigatory Mechanism  
Twenty-first century conflicts are likely to be characterized by a congested and messy 
information space, with respective parties seeking to win “hearts and minds” through 
psychological operations. Allegations of association with biological weapons can be a 
powerful weapon in this regard, serving to “vilify enemies and to calumniate rivals.”107 
As illustrated in the allegations and counter-allegations pertaining to chemical 
weapons use in Syria, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda are likely to 
also be rife in the event of apparent BW use.    
 
The changing speed and reach of these information warfare campaigns increases the 
value of independent assessments of allegations by a neutral body, such as the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism (UNSGM). The Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) established a network of designated, 
accredited laboratories that can analyze samples, which has been successfully tried 
and tested over the course of the conflict in Syria. While the UNSGM maintains access 
to this network, there does not exist a similar network for investigating alleged BW use, 
leaving the BW capacity of the UNSGM comparatively underdeveloped and 
uncertain.108 Enhancing the operational readiness of the UNSGM would therefore also 
feed into the compliance architecture.109  
 
This requires, inter alia, a process of updating rosters of expertise and laboratory 
facilities; developing minimal standards for rostered laboratories; improving sampling 
practices; enhancing the chain of custody procedures; calibrating lab methods and 
reporting requirements, all with a view to ensuring any biological investigation is able 
to withstand considerable international scrutiny.110 To this end, there is much that can 
be gleaned from the investigations in Syria, including those by the UNSGM, the 
OPCW, and the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism.  
 
Ideally, such a process would be undertaken multilaterally. However, in part because 
of the technical nature of discussions, and in part because of the stymying nature of 
political disagreement over the relevance of the UNSGM in the BWC context, the 
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mechanism might be explored more constructively through a collective of likeminded 
or interested actors working outside the convention, with findings relayed to 
practitioners of disarmament diplomacy as progress is made. 
Remedying the institutional deficit 
The Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency consists of a team of “over 
2,500 professional and support staff” and OPCW staff numbers around 500, while the 
BWC’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) consists of three people (with some additional 
support through the European Union), a staffing level incommensurably lower, even 
considering the significant differences in their tasks.111 If the 2017 meeting agrees to 
expand any BWC-related compliance activities—or indeed of any other activities of the 
BWC—a commensurate expansion of the ISU may be necessary. For example, the 
management and preliminary analysis of national reports will require some 
administrative support; science and technology reviews will require not insignificant 
organization, potentially also requiring ISU members’ “taking on the role of rapporteur 
helping to capture and distill technical discussions.”112 The ISU would clearly need to 
play an administrative role in any multilateral exploration of visits or indeed any form of 
facilitated consultative mechanisms. As Germany stated, it will be important to “ensure 
that the ISU’s mandate, resources, and staffing correspond appropriately to any decision 
we all might wish to agree upon for the intersessional period.”113 
 
In order to generate balance, any expansion of the ISU to undertake activities related to 
compliance (even broadly understood) will likely require a greater ISU role in 
international cooperation. The ISU is not “an operational agency in the field of 
international co-operation.” Nevertheless, if states are serious about international 
cooperation and technology transfer, there could be considerable value in expanding 
the ISU to include a post with some form of cooperation mandate.114 This could be as 
simple as actively working to identify relevant opportunities for cooperation and 
capacity building (through scholarships, e-learning, or funding). The details of such 
opportunities could then be collected, collated, and distributed to states parties on an 
episodic basis. While this would not resolve the Article X debate, it would generate 
prospects for more concrete Article X.  
Inside or Out  
There is clearly a great deal of work that needs to be done to understand—let alone 
begin to evaluate—BWC compliance, much of which is not feasible in the current 
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political climate. Nonetheless, there are several things that could be explored to 
strengthen the convention at present. Ideally, such activities would be undertaken in 
the multilateral setting of the BWC. However, as Lennane has noted, “states parties 
have a poor record on collective action to implement and strengthen its provisions,” 
and, as the Eighth Review Conference demonstrated, pursuing alternatives to a 
protocol is unlikely to be acceptable to some states. Given the controversy over 
making decisions outside the review conference process, expectations for the annual 
meeting in December 2017 should be treated with a healthy dose of realism.  
 
Yet the Eighth Review Conference also showed that many states are keen to engage in 
concrete activities and are actively looking for “substantive decisions to move 
ourselves to action.”115 As such, perhaps there is a need to disaggregate those topics 
that can be dealt with inside the BWC from those that are initially best suited to 
exogenous activity. For example, the UNSGM is unlikely to be a fruitful topic of 
discussion in the BWC context, but has already been taken forward exogenously 
through various national and regional initiatives and could be developed further in the 
future. In contrast, the development of a consultative mechanism under Article V is 
perhaps an area where progress can be made within the BWC, building on past 
precedent, updating previously agreed procedures, and perhaps even trialing different 
approaches to undertaking consultations.  
 
Some activities may require a hybrid approach. International scientific organizations 
such as the Inter Academy Panel, for example, have contributed significantly to 
reviewing S&T, and indeed, scientific experts working exogenously have much to 
contribute. However, there is a need for caution in such activities being outsourced 
entirely; first, because such a step could diminish the important voice of states in such 
a discussion, and, second, because some states remain concerned over 
nongovernmental scientists asserting too much influence over S&T reviews. As such, 
feeding external technical discussions on S&T of relevance to the BWC into a state-led 
S&T review process could be a useful way forward; the European Union has voiced its 
support for the idea through a 2016 Council Decision.116  
 
This is not to suggest that states parties develop a parallel track for BWC-related 
activities. But in cases where there are differing levels of ambition or overwhelming 
political obstacles to progress, testing ideas or collecting and collating information 
through “collectives of the willing” (or of the curious) might provide a better 
understanding of aspects of compliance and how it can be demonstrated. Such an 
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approach is not without precedent: several past initiatives have been pursued through 
untraditional routes to exploring new concepts with varying degrees of success.117  
Conclusions 
This paper argues that a process of sustained tending is required to maintain the 
relevance of the BWC and facilitate the convergence of expectations regarding 
compliance in a changing world. This may be easier said than done, since compliance 
is complicated. It requires taking into consideration both the positive and negative 
obligations of states parties to the convention, but it also requires attending to the 
inherent ambiguity of these obligations, their temporal nature, and the limited capacity 
of some states to carry them out.  
 
There is thus a need to episodically revisit compliance to prevent the convention 
becoming outmoded in a changing scientific and security context, and to do so prior to 
an event, in circumstances that are relatively more conducive to constructive 
dialogue.118 Although many states have maintained the principled position that this can 
only be achieved by returning to multilateral negotiations toward a legally binding 
verification protocol, this not feasible for the foreseeable future. Moreover, such a 
principled approach should not prevent states from further exploring the building blocks 
of compliance and looking at how processes of monitoring and assessing indicators of 
compliance and noncompliance could be updated for the twenty-first century.   
 
Achieving consensus on how to update these components is unlikely in the short term. 
The political division evident at the Eighth Review Conference in 2016 suggest a 
substantive work agenda for the next intersessional period might prove difficult to 
agree on later this year. Such a disappointing result will not necessarily have an 
immediate effect on the norm against the biological weapons. However, the continued 
inability to revisit compliance and make substantive progress at a time of significant 
change in science and security risks leaving the compliance to fester and fragment. The 
2017 Meeting of States Parties to the Convention held later this year offers an 
opportunity to rectify this trend, and bolster the prohibition of weapons deemed 
“repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”  
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